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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD JEREMY MATTINSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030474-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Appellant, RICHARD JEREMY MATTINSON ("Martinson"), appeals his 
conviction for communications fraud, a second degree felony, on March 13, 2003, and the 
district court's Judgment, Sentence, and Order for Commitment dated April 30, 2003. 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(d). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, otherwise known as the communi-
cations fraud statute, unconstitutionally overbroad and unconstitutionally vague, and 
therefore did the trial court err in denying Mattinson's motion to dismiss the communicat-
ions fraud charge? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW/PRESERVATION: Whether a statute is 
constitutional is a question of law. Grand County v. Emery County, 52 P.3d 1148, 1151 
(Utah 2002). A statute is presumed to be constitutional such that any reasonable doubts 
are resolved in favor of its constitutionality. Id. This issue was preserved by Mattinson's 
Motion to Dismiss the Alternative Charge of Communications Fraud (R. 59, 69). 
ISSUE 2: Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 unconstitutional as applied to the 
specific facts of this case? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW/PRESERVATION: Whether a statute is 
constitutional is a question of law. Grand County v. Emery County, 52 P.3d 1148, 1151 
(Utah 2002). A statute is presumed to be constitutional such that any reasonable doubts 
are resolved in favor of its constitutionality. Id. This issue was preserved by Mattinson's 
Motion to Dismiss the Alternative Charge of Communications Fraud (R. 59, 69). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Mattinson, was charged by Information on June 28, 2002, with 
identity fraud, a second degree felony, or in the alternative, communications fraud, a 
second degree felony (R. 2). Mattinson filed a Motion to Dismiss Alternative Charge of 
Communications Fraud with supporting memorandum on March 7, 2003, and filed an 
Addendum to Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Communications Fraud 
Charge; or Motion to Strike the Jury Trial and to Order the State to Provide a Bill of 
Particulars on March 11, 2003 (R. 59, 69, 92). 
The basis of Mattinson's motion to dismiss the communications fraud charge 
was that Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, and 
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also unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case (R. 59, 69, 92). Martinson's 
Request for a Bill of Particulars was grounded upon the fact that Mattinson did not have 
sufficient notice of the specific allegations to adequately prepare his defense for trial. On 
the day of trial, March, 13, 2003, the trial court denied Martinson's motion to dismiss the 
alternative charge of communications fraud (R. 198 at 131-32). The trial court stated that 
"the [communications fraud] statute prohibits conduct which would otherwise be allowed. 
This [meaning Martinson's conduct] isn't it." (R. 198 at 132). 
The trial court further denied Martinson's request for a Bill of Particulars (R. 
198 at 37). A motion in limine was filed prior to trial to exclude any reference to 
Martinson's marriage or criminal history, which motion the trial court granted in part and 
denied in part, excluding references to Martinson's criminal history but allowing 
references to Martinson's marriage to be admitted (R. 77). During the trial, Mattinson 
moved for a mistrial when one of the witnesses testified that Mattinson had been arrested 
and taken to jail for matters unrelated to this case, which motion the trial court denied on 
the grounds that "the mere mention that [Mattinson] went to jail at one point [was not] so 
prejudicial that it render[ed] this proceeding unfair." (R. 198 at 98, 103, 137). 
During the trial, and after the State rested, Mattinson moved to dismiss the 
identity fraud charge and the alternative communications fraud charge on the grounds of 
insufficient evidence (R. 198 at 132-35). The trial court initially denied and then later 
granted Mattinson's motion to dismiss the identity fraud charge based on the State's 
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failure to present sufficient evidence that Mattinson obtained personal identifying 
information of a person without authorization (R. 198 at 132-35, 179-82). However, the 
trial court denied Martinson's motion for a directed verdict on the communications fraud 
charge (R. 198 at 135-36). 
During jury deliberations, the jury submitted two questions to the trial court 
requesting definitions for the phrase "devised a scheme or artifice" and relative to the 
meaning of "anything of value" specifically as that phrase related to the obtaining of 
medical treatment rather than monetary value (R. 142) (ADDENDUM A). The jury 
subsequently convicted Mattinson of second degree felony communications fraud (R. 
144) and Mattinson timely filed his Notice of Appeal (R. 152). Mattinson is not currently 
incarcerated for this offense. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mattinson was charged with communications fraud based upon facts that arose 
when Mattinson took his seriously ill friend, Stevoni Wells ("Wells"), to the emergency 
admitting area of the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center ("UVRMC" or "hospital") on 
December 10, 2001 (R. 198 at 89). During the previous night, Mattinson stayed awake 
caring for Wells as she became progressively more ill (R. 198 at 141). To Martinson's 
dismay, Wells awoke on the morning of December 10, 2001, holding her back and crying, 
in a lot of pain, with a dangerously high fever and a limited ability to move (R. 198 at 97). 
Wells was suffering from life-threatening spinal meningitis (R. 198 at 97, 114-15). 
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Wells, who had suffered from the same disease approximately one year prior to 
this occasion, suspected that she had spinal meningitis and told Mattinson of her belief 
(R. 198 at 142). Mattinson was very concerned and asked Wells if she needed to go to 
the hospital (R. 198 at 142). Wells responded that she should go to the hospital but was 
afraid to because she believed there were existing warrants for her arrest (R. 198 at 143). 
Wells agreed to go to the hospital but insisted on using a false name on the 
hospital admission records for fear of being arrested on purported outstanding warrants 
(R. 198 at 51-3, 59, 99-100, 114). When asked on direct why she used a false name, 
Wells stated, "I was scared. I was still using [drugs], and I was really scared." (R. 198 at 
100). Wells had a history of using false names to avoid detection of her identity and 
thereby avoid arrest (R. 198 at 50-1, 62, 103-04). Wells stated that what she 
communicated to Mattinson with regard to her desire to use a false name was her concern 
about warrants; she never indicated to him that she was trying to avoid paying the medical 
bill (R. 198 at 119). 
Particularly in light of Wells's serious condition, Mattinson was not the least 
concerned about any purported warrants for Wells's arrest (R. 198 at 143). Mattinson 
cared very much for Wells and was only concerned about the fact that she might be 
suffering from a life-threatening illness that could result in permanent blindness and/or 
paralysis, or even death, and he wanted to ensure that Wells immediately received proper 
medical treatment (R. 198 at 143). 
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Mattinson testified that he was extremely worried about Wells and afraid that his 
failure to take Wells to the hospital the previous night might be detrimental to her 
recovery (R. 198 at 143-44). Mattinson drove Wells to UVRMC in his truck (R. 198 at 
98). Mattinson and Wells arrived at UVRMC and Mattinson parked his truck in the 15-
minute loading zone adjacent to the Emergency Room (R. 198 at 144). Mattinson helped 
Wells into the hospital and to the triage area where a nurse began asking Wells questions 
and assessing the seriousness of her condition (R. 198 at 145). Mattinson falsely 
represented to hospital staff that he was Wells's husband, which he believed was a 
necessary representation so that he could remain with Wells to ensure she received 
necessary treatment (R. 198 145-46, 164). 
As Wells was taken into the treating area, Mattinson left the building briefly to 
park his truck in a longer-term parking area (R. 198 at 146-47). At some point which 
could not be precisely identified for lack of knowledge, Stevoni Wells was falsely 
represented to be "Stacy Sorensen." When Mattinson returned from parking his vehicle, 
he was asked to provide "Stacy Sorensen5s", or his "wife's" social security number, 
which he stated he did not know; Mattinson was then asked to provide "Stacy 
Sorensen's" maiden name, and he provided the false name of "Wall" (R. 198 at 147). 
Accordingly, Wells was admitted to UVRMC under the name "Stacy Wall Sorensen", and 
Mattinson falsely represented himself to be "Jeremy Sorensen," "Stacy Sorensen's" 
husband (R. 198 53-4, 71), so that he could stay with her. 
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Wells testified that she did not remember "much of anything" from the day of 
her admission to UVRMC until she was awakened at the hospital prior to undergoing a 
spinal tap procedure, and even then did not remember much for approximately two days 
after her admission (R. 198 at 99). But she did know her false name of "Stacy Sorensen." 
Wells testified that on the day after her admission, she was cognizant enough to have a 
telephone conversation with her mother from her hospital room, and she requested that a 
doctor speak with her mother about her condition without disclosing her name (Stacy 
Sorensen) for fear of being arrested and taken into custody, because Wells was "on the 
run" and believed her mother would turn her in (R. 198 at 114-15). Wells testified, "In 
fact, I think the doctor called me Stacy to my mom, because my mom said something 
about that to me. She asked if I was under that name, and I said "no," or I can't 
remember, or I said I was under a false name, but I'm not sure." (R. 198 at 117). Wells 
also signed the name "Stacy Sorensen" when she was discharged and when Martinson 
was not present (R. 198 at 120). Wells testified that although she did not sign the consent 
form, she could have provided the false information contained in the form, but she was 
delirious and had no memory of who provided the information (R. 198 at 101, 108). 
The hospital admission records list "Jeremy Sorensen" as "Stacy Sorensen's" 
husband (R. 198 at 54). "Stacy Sorensen's" address is listed on the hospital admission 
records as being 417 North Potomac, Henderson Nevada (R. 198 at 54), and the social 
security number listed for "Stacy Sorensen" actually belongs to a Teresa Adams of Salt 
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Lake City (R. 198 at 57). Wells testified that she had previously resided at 474 Potomac, 
Henderson, Nevada with Travis Huebner, her former common-law husband; and that 
address was the previous residence of Catherine Huebner, Wells's ex-mother-in-law (R. 
198 at 110). The telephone number on the admission records for "Stacy Sorensen" also 
belonged to Catherine Huebner (R. 198 111). Wells further testified that she had 
memorized both the foregoing address and telephone number and that Martinson had 
never been to the Nevada address, and she had no knowledge of Mattinson ever calling 
that telephone number (R. 198 at 112-13). Mattinson testified that had never met 
Catherine Huebner, had never been even in the vicinity of the Nevada address, and that he 
had never even spoken to Wells's ex-husband, let alone called his telephone number (R. 
198 at 150-51) 
"Jeremy Sorensen's" address is listed on the hospital admissions records as 112 
North 300 East, Springville, Utah (R. 198 at 55), and the social security number on the 
form was invalid (R. 198 at 57). The bill for Wells's treatment, which totaled $5,867.83, 
was first mailed to the Henderson Nevada address for "Stacy Sorensen" and then to the 
Springville address for "Jeremy Sorensen, but delivery was unsuccessful and the bill was 
returned unpaid (R. 198 at 71-2). 
Teresa Rawle ("Rawle") was the registration secretary for the Emergency Room 
at UVRMC on December 10, 2001 (R. 198 at 75, 77). She testified that generally when a 
person comes to the hospital emergency room, unless they are brought by ambulance, 
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their condition will initially be assessed by a triage nurse (R. 198 at 76). After that initial 
assessment, the patient or a family member representing the patient then generally goes 
through registration procedures with Rawle. Id. The person who provides the 
registration information will then generally sign the registration document or consent 
form, which is also a consent for services, in Rawle's presence so she can witness the 
signature (R. 198 at 78, 87). However, on cross-examination, Rawle admitted that "very 
often" she will go into the emergency room to obtain requisite signatures for the consent 
form(R. 198 at 90). 
The only persons authorized to sign the consent form includes the patient, a legal 
guardian, or a blood relative (R. 198 at 82-3). The person who signed the consent form so 
"Stacy Sorensen" could receive necessary treatment was "Jeremy Sorensen," her 
purported husband (R. 198 at 78, 80). Mattinson testified that the consent form was 
brought to him while he was sitting with Wells after she had been admitted; Wells had 
been given a sedative and was "in and out of consciousness" so Mattinson was instructed 
to sign the consent form to enable Wells to receive a spinal tap (R. 198 at 148-49). 
Rawle further testified that "the patient and/or the person signing" the consent 
form is responsible for payment of the hospital bill (R. 198 at 79). The consent form 
contains the following pertinent language on the back of the document: 
"Consent for services on behalf of the patient. Consent is hereby given to the 
facility. It's contractors, medical staff, and employees to provide facility and 
other health care services to patient and administer physician orders for the 
benefit of patient. And it is understood there is a risk of substantial and serious 
9 
harm involved in such facility and health care services, and such risk is accepted 
in the hope of obtaining beneficial results from such services." 
"Patient, and the undersigned if other than the patient, each jointly and severally 
agree to pay for the health care services rendered to patient at the facility, 
including but not limited to any amounts not paid by any insurance company or 
other third-party payer." 
(R. 198 at 80). Rawle testified that she does not tell people who sign the registration 
document to read the back of the form (R. 198 at 83). She further testified that she gives 
patients a "very brief "rundown" of the form, which "rundown" may or may not include 
an explanation of payment obligations, and she is further aware that a lot of patients do 
not read the back of the form; it is their choice whether or not to do so (R. 198 at 84). 
However, Rawle also testified that if the patient has no insurance, she will always tell the 
person signing the form that they were financially responsible for treatment, although she 
had no memory of either her meeting or conversation with Wells or Mattinson on 
December 10, 2001 (R. 198 at 86). Mattinson testified that he never read the back of the 
consent form, that he was never told to read the back of the form, he was never told that 
by signing the form he was accepting financial responsibility > and that he only understood 
that it was necessary for him to sign the consent form so that Wells could receive 
necessary treatment (R. 198 at 148-49). 
As mentioned previously, Wells has a history of providing false information to 
avoid arrest. Wells testified that Mattinson was unaware of her using false names on 
prior occasions because he "strongly disagreed" with her drug use and related unlawful 
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conduct and therefore she kept such conduct hidden from him (R. 198 at 104, 120-21). 
Wells further testified that avoiding arrest was her primary motivation for using a false 
name on December 10, 2001, and that she was much more concerned about her 
outstanding warrants than Mattinson was (R. 198 at 104). Wells ultimately pleaded guilty 
to a reduced charge of third degree felony forgery for her conduct in relation to the facts 
of this case (R. 198 at 106). The factual basis in her statement/affidavit in support of her 
guilty plea stated, "On December 12, 2001, in Provo, Utah with a purpose to avoid 
medical charges, I signed a fictitious name to a 'Release From Responsibility For 
Discharge' form." (R. 198 at 107). 
The investigating officer, Detective Darin Falslev ("Falsev") stated that when he 
contacted Mattinson about this case, Mattinson was very cooperative and did not try to 
hide any of the facts (R. 198 at 51-3, 59). Mattinson frankly admitted to Falslev that he 
had taken Wells to the hospital and that Wells had in fact provided a false name to avoid 
arrest. Id. Mattinson told Falslev that Wells's sole reason for using a false name was to 
avoid arrest (R. 198 61). Mattinson also told Falslev that he had taken Wells to the 
hospital because she was very ill and in a lot of pain (R. 198 at 60). Mattinson further 
explained to Falslev that Wells believed there were warrants for her arrest and had 
therefore provided a false name to avoid the possibility of going to jail. Mattinson 
admitted taking Wells to UVRMC on December 10, 2001 and of providing the false name 
of "Wall" as "Stacy Sorensen's" maiden name (R. 198 53-4). Finally, consistent with 
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Wells's testimony, Mattinson testified that he not only never had any intent to defraud 
UVRMC of services, but that the issue of money and billing never even crossed his mind 
when he was seeking medical care for Wells (R. 198 at 153). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, also known as the communications fraud statute, 
is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The broad and vague language criminalizes an 
unmeasurable array of constitutionally protected speech and thereby impermissibly allows 
an unconstitutionally excessive amount of prosecutorial discretion. That statute is a 
poorly drafted attempt to prohibit fraudulent conduct, presumably involving scams where 
monetary gain is the chief objective. What the statute does in effect, however, is prohibit 
any and all communications that may be construed as dishonest because it criminalizes 
any false or misleading communication (or material omission) made directly or indirectly 
to any person for the purpose of obtaining anything of value. And while dishonesty in its 
various forms may be unethical, some falsehoods are constitutionally protected and not all 
dishonest conduct should be subject to criminal sanctions. 
The communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because it 
prohibits a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, such as freedom of 
speech and the press. As long as anything of value is the object sought, there need be no 
victim and no intent to defraud. Further, the statute is so broad that it encompasses 
several, more specifically defined provisions of the Utah Criminal Code yet imposes 
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much harsher sanctions. For one example, providing false information to a peace officer 
for the purpose of avoiding arrest is a class B misdemeanor with a maximum punishment 
of 6 months in jail; yet, as this case perfectly illustrates, providing the same false 
information to a private citizen for the same purpose is a second degree felony with a 
maximum punishment of 15 years in prison. 
Moreover, the statute is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it is facially 
invalid. The vague terms of the statute are very subjective and therefore not susceptible 
to objective measurement as required for the statute to survive constitutional scrutiny. 
The statute is also not readily subject to a narrowing construction, such that a person of 
ordinary intelligence cannot foresee that certain conduct prohibited by the statute would 
be construed as criminal, and persons of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application, as this case and many others compellingly 
demonstrate. That the State even decided to charge Martinson with a second degree 
felony based upon the sympathetic facts of this case illuminates the fact that the statute 
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
Further, the statute fails to define the offense and therefore does not adequately 
provide notice of proscribed conduct, such that ordinary people cannot understand what 
conduct is prohibited. The vague and overly broad language of the communications fraud 
statute sweeps within its ambit an infinite spectrum of prohibited conduct that is protected 
by the First Amendment. For example, among other protected speech, so-called 
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•'puffing" in advertising and much of political speech, are subject to criminal sanctions 
under the communications fraud statute. Accordingly, the statute suffers both from 
unconstitutional overbreadth and is void for vagueness. 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 is unconstitutional as applied to the facts 
of this case because its broad and vague provisions bootstrap the facts of this case into a 
second degree felony via the fact that false statements were made to a private citizen/ 
entity rather than to a peace officer, under which circumstances the offense would be only 
a class B misdemeanor. Further, the punishment in this case is unconstitutional because it 
is disproportionate to the offense. 
ARGUMENT1 
L THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS OVERBROAD AND 
FACIALLY INVALID BECAUSE IT PROHIBITS CONSTITUTION-
ALLY PROTECTED CONDUCT IN A MANNER THAT IS BOTH REAL 
AND SUBSTANTIAL. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1801 (1995) provides: 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to 
obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who 
]As this Court is aware, other cases challenging the constitutionality of the 
communications fraud statute are pending before this Court, particularly State v. Norris, 
Case Nos. 20020966-CA and 20030817-CA, and State v. Bradshaw, Case No. 20020137-
CA. Variants of arguments set forth in briefs for Case Nos. 20030817-CA and 20020137, 
written by Elizabeth Hunt and Kent Hart, respectively, are included herein. Further, some 
of the arguments set forth in the briefs related to Case No. 20020966-CA and written by 
counsel in this case are also included herein. 
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communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than 
$1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than 
$5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be 
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought 
to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as 
provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense 
described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing 
of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and 
offense of communication fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to 
talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the 
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mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newpaper, computer, and 
spoken and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or 
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
Under this broad language, at a minimum it is a criminal offense to devise an 
artifice to obtain anything of value by means of a false communication of any kind. 
Because the statute does not define "artifice" or "value," the common English language 
definitions are used. "Artifice" is defined as "false or insincere behavior", "an artful 
stratagem" or "trick." WEBSTERS NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983), at 
106. Under these broad definitions, an artifice always underlies any dishonest 
communication, because a dishonest communication is by definition a trick or false or 
insincere behavior. 
Furthermore, "value" is defined as "fair price", "the equivalent of something in 
money", "that quality of a thing according to which it is thought of as being more or less 
desirable, useful, estimable, important,", "that which is desirable or worthy of esteem for 
its own sake; thing or quality having intrinsic worth", "valued". WEBSTERS, supra, p 
2018. 
"In considering whether a statute suffers from overbreadth 'a court's first task is 
to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct.'" IML. v. State, 61 P.3d 1038, 1043 (Utah 2002) (quoting Houston v. 
Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987) (citations omitted) {see also, State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 
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183, 192 (Utah 1987) ("Statutory overbreadth . . . is a substantive due process question 
which addresses the issue of whether the statute in question is so broad that it may not 
only prohibit unprotected behavior but may also prohibit constitutionally protected 
activity as well.")). 
Criminal statutes that make a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct unlawful must be scrutinized with particular care and may be held facially invalid 
even if they also have legitimate application. LM.L v. State, 61 P.3d at 1043. For a court 
to find that a statute is unconstitutional for being over broad, the overbreadth must be 
both real and substantial. State v. Morrison, 31 P.3d 547, 551 (Utah 2001). 
"A statute will be invalidated for overbreadth only if it 'does not aim specifically 
at evils within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its 
ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of 
speech or the press.'" Provo City v. Whatcott, 1 P.3d 1113,1114 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 
(quoting Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) {see also, Salt 
Lake City v. Wheeler, 466 P.2d 838 (Utah 1970) (holding a statute unconstitutionally 
overbroad for its potential to violate the fourth amendment prohibition against unlawful 
searches and seizures)). Further, an overbroad statute is facially invalid if it is not readily 
subject to a narrowing construction. Provo City v. Whatcott, 1 P.3d at 1114. Courts 
should construe a statute as constitutional whenever possible. Id. However, in seeking a 
constitutional construction, a court "should not rewrite the statute or ignore its plain 
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meaning/' Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989). 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to 
freedom of speech and the press. The comparable provision of the Utah Constitution 
provides in relevant part, "No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press," UTAH CONST, art. I, § 15. This state provision is also deemed 
"more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment [to the United States 
Constitution]." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1017 (Utah 1994) (quoting 
Jacoby v. State Bar, 562 P.2d 1326, 1329 n. 2 (Ca. 1977). 
The Utah Supreme Court has analyzed attempts to inhibit freedoms of 
expression under the primacy model, examining the totality of circumstances first under 
the state constitution, then considering the issue under the federal constitution only if the 
issue cannot be resolved under the state constitution. West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 
P.2d 999). Further, "the state [of Utah] does not deny any right claimed under the federal 
Constitution when the claim before the court in fact is folly met by state law." Id. at 1006 
(citing Sterling v. Cupp, 624 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1981). Language or communication 
which may offend "the taste and moral sense of a substantial part of the community . . . is 
part of the price of free speech . . ." Id. at 1013 (quoting Note, Fair Comment, 62 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1207, 1216 (1949)). The state constitution therefore "reflects the positive attitude 
of the constitution's drafters toward a free and uninhibited press." Id. at 1014. 
Moreover, "[t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehoods in 
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order to protect speech that matters." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 
(1974) (emphasis added). Any legislative enactment that violates the First Amendment 
cannot be justified on the basis that "such limitation [is] intimately related to substantial 
government interest in preventing fraud and protecting public safety . . . " Village of 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 445 U.S. 972 (1980); see also, 
Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (holding that a municipality may 
not enact regulations in the interest of public safety, health, welfare or convenience that 
abridge individual liberties secured by the federal constitution). Legislation that imposes 
criminal liability for all falsehoods is not only overbroad such that it abridges protected 
speech in a manner that is both real and substantial, it is unwise. 
"Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional 
protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate. As James Madison 
pointed out in the Report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798: 'Some degree of 
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this 
more true than in that of the press.' 4 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitut-
ion of 1787, p. 571 (1876)." 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 340. 
"Falsehood" is defined as "deception," "the telling of lies; lying," "lack of 
honesty," "treachery," "dishonesty," "deceitfulness," "perfidy." WEBTERS NEW UNIVER-
SAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, Second Edition (1983), p. 661. The definition of 
"falsehood" therefore presupposes an intent or scienter often exceeding a reckless 
disregard for the truth. Indeed, it is easy to conceive of several examples of relatively 
harmless falsehoods made knowingly and intentionally. 
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This understanding that a "falsehood" by definition cannot exist without at least 
a reckless disregard for the truth, further compels the conclusion that even some 
falsehoods made knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, are 
protected speech, since by definition, all falsehoods are made with specific intent. 
However, contrary to the fact that some falsehoods are expressly afforded constitutional 
protection, the language of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 broadly imposes criminal 
liability for all falsehoods. This fact is further manifest in the futile exercise of trying to 
imagine a falsehood that is not prohibited under the broad language of the statute. Thus, 
the issue with regard to the overbreadth of the communications fraud statute is whether 
allowing criminal prosecution and sanctions based on all false communications would 
abridge or restrain freedom of expression and the press. Because the statute criminalizes 
all falsehoods, some of which are expressly provided constitutional protection, the statute 
is unconstitutionally overbroad in a manner that is both real and substantial. 
Further, it is the potential for overly broad application that must be carefully 
scrutinized in this analysis. "Where regulations of liberty of free discussion are 
concerned, there are special reasons for observing the rule that it is the statute, and not the 
accusation or the evidence under it, which prescribes the limits of permissible conduct 
and warns us against transgression." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1939). 
The overbreadth and thus the confusion caused by the overly broad language set 
forth in the elements of the communications fraud statute was compellingly demonstrated 
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in this case. The jury, during its deliberations, requested specific instructions relative to 
the meaning and application of "devised a scheme or artifice" and "anything of value." 
ADDENDUM A. The trial court responded to the jury's inquiries by explaining in 
pertinent part that "artifice" "is defined as 'trickery' or an 'artful trick/" In response to 
the jury's additional question as to whether Wells's receiving treatment might qualify as 
"anything of value" to Martinson, the trial court instructed: 
What you have asked is a question of fact. If you determine that hospital 
treatment is a thing of value which is the object of a scheme or artifice to 
• defraud you may consider if the requisite value is met. You may also determine 
if hospital treatment is something of value which cannot be given a dollar worth 
for purposes of "something other than monetary value." The intent of [Jury] 
instruction 4 is to explain that in order to establish a violation of the relevant 
statute the evidence must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a scheme or 
artifice to defraud to obtain something existed and, then, to determine the nature 
and/or value of whatever was sought. 
ADDENDUM A. Because Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 criminalizes false or insincere 
behavior/trickery, the object of which is to obtain anything of value, i.e. considered 
desirable, useful, estimable, or important as per the common definition, the statute 
effectively criminalizes all false communications. This is so because trickery or insincere 
behavior, by definition, underlies all false communications; and the object of such 
communications will always be something considered of value to the communicator. 
This case also illustrates the overly broad application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1801. Martinson is accused of providing some false information to UVRMC, which 
allegation Martinson concedes is true. However, Martinson denies providing such 
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information with any intent to defraud the hospital, and in fact there is no evidence that 
Mattinson had any intent to defraud anyone of anything. Martinson's sole purpose or 
object in providing false information was to enable him to stay with Wells, which 
conclusion is the only one supported by the evidence in this case. There is no evidence 
that Wells would not have received the necessary treatment unless her "husband" was 
present. Indeed, the evidence was that Wells was immediately admitted once the 
potential seriousness of her condition was determined. There is no evidence nor is it 
argued that Martinson's false representation that he was Wells's husband and that her 
maiden name was Wall was necessary for her treatment; indeed, such a claim would be 
ludicrous on its face. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that Wells could not have signed the consent 
form herself, at least before she was sedated. In sum, there is no evidence to suggest that 
•'Stacy Sorensen" was provided medical treatment contingent upon her having a husband 
with her. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that if Mattinson had simply left Wells 
at the hospital admitting area, she would not have obtained the undisputably necessary 
treatment. In short, Mattinson provided false information to the hospital so he could stay 
with Wells as her "husband" and thereby monitor her well-being and treatment, and was 
convicted of a second degree felony for doing so. This fact sheds significant light upon 
the impetus behind the jury's understandable perplexity over the meaning and application 
of the broad and vague phrase, "anything of value." 
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Indeed, based upon the jury's questions relative to the meaning and application 
of such language as "scheme," "artifice" and "anything of value", it is reasonable to 
conclude that the jury found Mattinson guilty of trickery devised to stay with Wells and to 
monitor her medical treatment - rather than of devising a systematic plan or scheme to 
defraud the hospital of some monetary value. Accordingly, this case illustrates the real 
and substantial broad application of the communications fraud statute. 
The additional fact that the trial court even determined that Utah Code Ann. §76-
10-1801 prohibits otherwise lawful conduct is compelling, and further supports 
Martinson's claim that the statute is facially invalid for overbreadth. Even if Martinson's 
conduct is deemed dishonest, unethical, and perhaps even subject to criminal liability, and 
even if this is a case where the communications fraud statute might have legitimate 
application, the statute still can not pass the strict constitutional scrutiny required if it 
prohibits a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, which it does. 
As the above analysis demonstrates, one need only analyze the plain language of 
the statute for its overly broad application to be revealed. Section 76-10-1801 makes it a 
crime not simply to lie, but to not be forthcoming with the truth, and the intent need only 
be a reckless disregard for the truth, even under the most urgent circumstances as existed 
in this case. There need be no intent to defraud, just a desire to obtain something of 
value. This fact, which again is illustrated by this case as set forth above, is perhaps one 
of the most troubling consequences of the broad language contained in the statute. 
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As long as there is an artifice, a false communication in any form made for the 
purpose of executing the artifice, and a desire to obtain anything of value, the elements of 
the communications fraud statute are soundly met. Indeed, if no dollar amount can be 
assigned to the value obtained, or in other words, if the value of the thing obtained is 
subjective and has value only to the person obtaining it, such as illustrated in this case, the 
underlying conduct constitutes a second degree felony, the highest offense possible under 
the statute, punishable by up to 15 years in prison and a fine of up to $10,000. Thus, the 
paradox created by the absurd fact that a carefully devised scheme to defraud an elderly 
person of $999 or even $4,999 is subject to a substantially lesser penalty than lying about 
one's identity for the benign purpose of staying with a loved one at the hospital. 
Further, under the statute, the term "communicate" is given the broadest possible 
meaning in Subsection (6), comprising every conceivable mode of communication and 
including simply to "make known." And the requisite intent need only be a reckless 
disregard for the truth, a mens rea commonly underlying many editorials and much of 
political speech. Thus, the spectrum of constitutionally protected communications 
prohibited by this poorly drafted statute is only as broad as the imagination, and the broad, 
all inclusive language of the communications fraud statute prohibits constitutionally 
protected conduct in a manner that is both real and substantial. 
In political speech and advertising, so-called "puffing" and political commentary 
are constitutionally protected forms of communication under both article I, section 15 of 
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the Utah Constitution and the First Amendment of the federal Constitution. Consider the 
candidate who, with a mere reckless disregard for the truth, either misrepresents or makes 
the material omission regarding his position on a divisive issue, and he intentionally does 
so for the purpose of obtaining votes; or the advertiser who directly or indirectly falsely 
communicates to consumers that a certain brand of lipstick stays on all day, or that a 
certain mascara does not clump, knowing that the opposite is true. There is hardly an 
advertisement, whether it be placed in a newspaper or aired on the television, that one 
could not argue communicates something about the product with at least a reckless 
disregard for the truth. And there is never a political campaign devoid of 
communications that are deliberately misleading. 
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Arguably, such communications may be considered immoral and unethical, but 
they are expressly not illegal. Yet under the plain language of the communications fraud 
statute, much of political speech and advertising - speech that matters on some level -
expose the communicators to criminal liability and sanctions. 
The communications fraud statute prohibits constitutionally protected speech in 
a manner that is both real and substantial. It aims well beyond evils within the allowable 
area of state control in that it inhibits behavior that constitutes an exercise of freedom of 
speech and the press. Moreover, the language contained in § 76-10-1801 is so broad and 
inclusive that it is not subject to a narrowing construction. Indeed, the statute is used as a 
type of catch-all for the State when it desires to prosecute persons for dishonest conduct 
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that is not otherwise defined under any provision of the criminal code, or, under the 
State's broad discretion, to simply harass persons whose conduct may be more 
appropriately charged as a lesser offense.2 As this case illustrates, §76-10-1801 lends 
itself well to such discretionary prosecution. 
Further, there is no way to construe the statute as constitutional short of 
rewriting it or ignoring its plain meaning. As such, under the law cited herein, the statute 
must be held facially invalid regardless of any legitimate application it may have. 
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE CANNOT SURVIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY BECAUSE IT IS VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS. 
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution guarantee due process of law. These due process 
provisions both require legislation to be sufficiently specific such that it provides notice 
of proscribed conduct. State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1987); In re Boyer, 
636 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Utah 1981). The void for vagueness doctrine is designed to 
ensure that citizens have notice of the legal consequences of their actions, and to prevent 
delegation of policy/legislative matters to those who enforce and apply the law. Grayned 
v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). 
A statute is unconstitutionally vague if "persons of common intelligence must 
2This case, for example, might have been charged as a forgery, a third degree 
felony. 
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necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Provo City v. Thompson, 
44 P.3d 828, 834 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 
266 (1997) (citations omitted). Whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague depends on 
whether it adequately notices proscribed conduct. State v. Morrison, 31 P.3d at 553. 
Further, "to avoid chilling the exercise of vital First Amendment rights, restriction of 
expression must be expressed in terms which clearly inform citizens of prohibited 
conduct and in terms susceptible of objective measurement." LM.L. v. State, 61 P.3d at 
1043 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). "[A] statute, which readily lends itself to 
harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against a particular 
group [or individual] deemed to merit their displeasure, results in a continuous and 
pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as 
within its purview." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. at 97-8. 
This Court provided guidance on the "void for vagueness" doctrine in State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), explaining that a statute is 
unconstitutionally vague if it fails to define an offense such that ordinary people cannot 
understand what conduct is prohibited. Id, at 927. The statute must also be crafted in 
such a way that it does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Id. 
Otherwise, if prohibited conduct is not clearly defined, a statute is void for vagueness. Id. 
Further, unconstitutionally vague laws have the potential to trap innocent persons by not 
providing fair warning of the prohibited conduct. Id. (quoting Groyned v. City of 
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Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108-9 (1972)). 
"Vague laws offend several important values. . . . A vague law impermissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc 
and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application. . . . [Wjhere a vague law abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First 
Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms." Graynedv. 
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108-9; see also, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 
(1983) (explaining that laws are void for vagueness where they allow the executive and 
judicial branches of government excessive discretion to discriminate in the enforcement 
and application of the laws). 
Article V section 1 of the Utah Constitution also requires a separation of 
government powers and recognizes and requires the precise balance and separation 
between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government. See, State v. 
Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977) (holding that a statute unconstitutionally violated the 
separation of powers provision where it delegated to the attorney general authority to 
define elements and punishments of crimes); State v. Blowers, 111 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Utah 
1986) (Howe, J., concurring) ("It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set 
a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to courts to step inside and 
say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some 
extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of government.") (quotation 
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and citation omitted). 
Applying these principles to the communications fraud statute, it is apparent 
from the outset that it has several problems that prevent it from surviving constitutional 
scrutiny. The inherently subjective and troubling phrase ''anything of value" is not even 
remotely susceptible to objective measurement and is therefore open to interpretation. 
Something has value if it is valued5 and as demonstrated in this case, the plain statutory 
language allows a jury to so find. 
The term "artifice" is not defined and is therefore subject to a common language 
definition, which as previously noted defines the term as merely "false or insincere 
behavior" or a "trick," - terms that can be used to describe any form of dishonesty. A 
harmless practical joke is a trick, and apparently a second degree felony. The word 
"communicate" is also given the broadest possible definition under the statute, and is 
therefore inherently vague. False information can be indirectly communicated - without 
any limitation on the means - by bestowing, conveying, making known, imparting, or 
transmitting. For lack of a better example, a push-up bra conveys or imparts or makes 
known false information, the point being that the conduct prohibited by the broad and 
vague language of the communications fraud statute is literally as broad as the 
imagination. 
Because the language of the communications fraud statute is so vague, and 
because the trial court denied Mattinson's request for a Bill of Particulars, the State had 
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an enviable number of options on which to proceed in its prosecution of this case and 
theories it presented to the jury. For example, the State could and did argue that 
Mattinson aided and abetted Wells in defrauding the hospital of the value of medical 
services. The State also could and did argue that if the jury did not buy the theory that 
Mattinson sought to defraud the hospital, Mattinson received "anything of value" by 
helping Wells avoid arrest (R. 198 196-201). Or, as the jury presumably found in this 
case, the State could argue that Mattinson obtained value by being allowed to stay with 
Wells as her purported husband and to monitor her medical treatment. In other words, 
Mattinson had no way to prepare adequately for trial based upon the allegations in this 
case because he did not know what "anything of value" was; and persons of common 
intelligence must and did necessarily guess at the statute's meaning and differ as to its 
application. Perhaps more compelling, this case demonstrates how the statute can easily 
be enforced in an arbitrary and discriminatory matter and how the vague language 
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
Another problem demonstrating the vagueness of the communications fraud 
statute involves the interface of subsections 2 and 5. Subsection 2 provides that the 
degree of offense is determined by aggregating the monetary value obtained; yet 
subsection 5 provides that each separate communication is a separate count of 
communications fraud. So in this case, Mattinson could conceivably have been charged 
with separate second degree felony counts for every false communication he made. If 
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execution of a scheme or artifice includes 100 false communications, and an aggregate 
value of $5,000 is the object sought to be obtained, under the confusing and poorly 
thought out language of the statute, 100 second degree felony counts could be filed. 
The vagueness of the communications fraud statute was problematic in this case 
because the Information did not provide sufficient notice of what specific conduct the 
State was alleging constituted the offense, thus inhibiting Martinson's ability to prepare 
his defense. Indeed, the fact that the State charged communications fraud in the 
alternative suggests that the State was even unsure how Martinson's conduct fit within the 
statutory language. 
A defendant is entitled to know from the outset of a criminal prosecution what 
specific conduct the State is alleging constitutes a crime so he can adequately prepare his 
defense. But, as this case clearly demonstrates, it is much easier for the State to present 
multiple facts and then leave application of those facts and interpretation of the statute for 
the jury to decide. Not specifically defining the offense inhibits the defendant's ability to 
adequately prepare his defense; but it also increases the odds that the State will obtain a 
conviction. The vague language of the communications fraud statute has this very effect 
on a criminal prosecution, thereby leaving the defendant at a distinct and unfair 
disadvantage on multiple levels. The trial court's additional denial of Martinson's 
Request for a Bill of Particulars in this case made it very difficult for Martinson to 
prepare his defense because it was never revealed specifically what the State alleged was 
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the purported object of Mattinson's admittedly false communications. The State 
proceeded on multiple theories at trial, and Mattinson has only gleaned from the jury 
questions what the jury's probable conclusion was with regard to the element of 
"anything of value." 
And as the present case further demonstrates, § 76-10-1801 is so readily subject 
to differing interpretations and applications that the State can bring criminal charges 
against various defendants based on facts that differ as widely as the defendants 
themselves, thus failing to provide adequate notice of proscribed conduct, encouraging 
arbitrary and discriminatory application and enforcement, and placing matters of policy in 
the hands of police, prosecutors, judges and juries. Accordingly, § 76-10-1801 is 
unconstitutional and void for vagueness. 
III. SECTION 76-10-1801 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, PARTICULARLY AS 
APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
The facts of this case are an unconstitutional application of Utah Code Ann. §76-
10-1801. The hospital could not arrest Wells, nor was that her fear. Rather, she feared 
that somehow law enforcement would become aware of her location if she used her real 
name. Under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-503 and 76-8-504, the same false statements made 
for exactly the same purpose is only a class B misdemeanor. However, because the 
statements in this case were made to a private citizen rather than to a public servant, 
Mattinson was convicted of a second degree felony. The punishment of 1-15 years in 
prison associated with Mattinson's conduct in this case is disproportionate to the offense, 
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in violation of the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment as set forth in 
Article 1 § 9 of the Utah Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. See, State v. Herrera, 993 P.2d 854, 866-67 (Utah 1999) (explaining that a 
punishment is excessive if it "contravenes standards of decency and human dignity"); 
State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Utah 1996) (explaining that a punishment 
disproportionate to the crime committed violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment); State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 365, cert denied, 534 U.S. 1018 (2001) ("A 
criminal punishment is cruel and unusual under article I, section 9 if it is 'so 
disproportionate to the offense committed that it 'shocks the moral sense of all reasonable 
men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.'" (citations omitted). 
This fact is problematic and serves to further illustrate the unconstitutional 
overbreadth and vagueness of the communications fraud statute, particularly as applied to 
the facts of this case. The statute is so broad that it encompasses several, more 
specifically defined provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, including but not limited to 
those cited herein. Moreover, there is no way that a person of ordinary intelligence could 
foresee that a false statement made for the sole purpose of avoiding arrest, while exposing 
him to sanctions including possibly six months in jail if made directly to a public servant, 
would expose him to much harsher sanctions including up to fifteen years in prison if the 
same statement was made to a private citizen. Such a convoluted result could not have 
been intended by the legislature as it defies logic and common sense. 
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Indeed, this case is a prime example of the abuse that can and does occur 
because of the overbroad and vague language contained in the statute. And as this case 
illustrates, even the State was not sure how Mattinson's conduct might have constituted a 
criminal act. Martinson was charged with identity fraud, or in the alternative, 
communications fraud. Because of the facts of this case, it was likely from the outset (as 
proved to be true at trial) that the State's evidence would not meet the requisite elements 
of the identity fraud statute. However, given the generously broad, vague and sweeping 
provisions of the communications fraud statute, the State dramatically increased the 
likelihood of obtaining a conviction, which in fact it did. 
As has been previously discussed, the State's theory of the value element was 
never clear. Indeed, in its closing arguments, the State addressed this element as follows: 
"[W]hat was the value? . . . Mr. McBride talked about that - from the accounts 
person. He said that the value is $5,867. That's the bill for the hospital. The 
State has to prove that it was more than $5,000. This evidence right here will 
prove that. 
The second part of that element is that - and you can look at that - that the 
object or the scheme or the artifice to defraud is something other than obtaining 
something of monetary value. Well, what was the biggest thing they were trying 
to do here that wasn't monetary value? That was the warrants. That doesn't 
have monetary value on it, but they are communicating to the hospital. . . . And 
finally [Martinson says, 'I'm going to take you [Wells].' And I really do believe 
that he was concerned about her. I don't doubt that at all. However, he knew 
that the warrants were out. He didn't want her to get arrested. He cared about 
her. He said so. So therefore, you can either use the value of the bill or you can 
look at the warrants, and that's nothing - that's something other than monetary 
value. 
. . . Mr. Martinson said, 'I lied because I cared about her [Wells].' Is it okay to 
commit a crime, to provide false information just because you care about 
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someone else? What if we ran our society that way? Just as long as you care 
about another person, it's okay to lie, and you shouldn't be held responsible for 
it as long as you care about another person. Well, that's not what the law says. 
The law is pretty straight forward, and those elements are here in your 
instructions. If you look at those elements, the State has met its burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. One of the ways we met it is Mr. Martinson has 
admitted to it. How much more proof can you get than Mr. Martinson admitting 
to it?" 
R. 198 at 196-97, 200-01. In its rebuttal closing arguments, the State continued: 
"If you look at [Jury Instruction] No. 4, where it talks about 'artifice or scheme 
to defraud another' - that word - 'or you can device (sic) a scheme or artifice, or 
in order to obtain from another money or anything of value, by fraud, by 
misrepresentations, false' - so the State believes there is this scheme and 
artifice, but if yo don't buy off on that, if you don't think that the State has met 
it's burden on the scheme, even though they are in cahoots in this, and they agree 
to be husband and wife, you can still go to the other and say, You know what? 
They knew that they were going to be obtaining it, something from the hospital 
and of value, and they lied about it. 
THE COURT: Counsel, let's approach. 
(Discussion held at the bench.) 
MR. TAYLOR: It's nice to be surrounded by people smarter than myself. I'm 
going to make a clarification. When you look at [Jury Instruction] No. 4 - even 
these instructions confuse me. When you look at device (sic), scheme, artifice to 
fraud (sic) another or obtain something of money or value, probably that should 
be that - well, I'm going to say this is what the law says: You need to find 
whether there's been a scheme or artifice to defraud. We already talked about 
that. I'll let that one go " 
R. 198 at 216-17. Jury Instruction No. 4 referred to by the State in these arguments 
provides the value element under subsection 4, "Devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value . . . " ADDENDUM B. And 
as has already been discussed, the jury specifically asked if "anything of value" might 
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also include Wells receiving medical treatment, to which the trial court responded the 
inquiry was a question of fact completely within the jury's province and discretion. 
Therefore, although the State argued that the jury could find that the value element was 
satisfied either by the monetary value of the services obtained or by Wells's avoidance of 
arrest, the jury apparently and understandably rejected the State's notion that Martinson 
sought or had the intent to defraud the hospital of services or to avoid the warrants for 
Wells's arrest. The evidence certainly did not support the jury finding otherwise. 
The jury apparently did believe, however, that Martinson obtained value simply 
because someone he cared about received necessary medical services, which was 
supported by the evidence. And although it is certain that Wells would have obtained the 
necessary treatment without Martinson falsely representing to be her husband, his lie was 
an artifice made for the intent to be able to stay with Wells and to ensure that she was 
properly cared for. Martinson thereby obtained the unmeasurable value of peace of mind 
associated with the fact that someone whom he deeply cared about might survive an 
illness that would prove fatal if left untreated - a second degree felony, as it were, and as 
it still is. The jury understandably found that such an obscure and intangible value fit 
within the broad "anything of value" language set forth in the statute and that was 
expressly included in the Jury Instructions. And "anything of value," in the statutory 
context and according to the State's closing arguments, is something other than money or 
property. In light of this fact, Martinson could not have avoided conviction. 
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These facts further illustrate the problem of the vagueness of the statute as 
applied to this case. From the outset, it is clear that persons of common intelligence 
guessed at the meaning of the "anything of value" language and differed as to its 
application. The jury rejected the State's theory on this element and came up with their 
own. Since "value" is a relative and subjective term and because the evidence did not 
support the State's arguments, the fact that the jury reached their own conclusion about 
the meaning and application of the "value" Martinson obtained is not surprising. 
The facts of this case perfectly demonstrate that Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 
is not readily subject to a narrowing construction, and the plain meaning of the broad and 
vague language cannot simply be ignored. This case shows how the broad and vague 
language of the communications fraud statute is not susceptible to objective 
measurement, but is in fact inherently subjective in nature. And as this case further 
demonstrates, § 76-10-1801 is so readily subject to differing interpretations and 
applications that the State can bring criminal charges against various defendants based 
upon facts that differ as widely as the defendants themselves, thus readily lending itself 
well to and encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory application, thereby impermissibly 
placing matters of policy directly into the hands of police, prosecutors, judges and juries. 
Accordingly, § 76-10-1801 is unconstitutional, particularly as applied to the facts of this 
case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, Appellant, Richard Jeremy Mattinson, 
respectfully requests this Court to vacate his convictions on the grounds that § 76-10-
1801 is unconstitutional in that it is both overly broad and void for vagueness. 
Respectfully submitted this \[ .15. day of May, 2004. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
Jennifer K. Gowans § 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Jury Questions 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Jury Question 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. 
Case No. 021402530 
Richard Jeremy Martinson, : 
Judge James R. Taylor 
Defendant. : Division 1 
During deliberation the jury forwarded the following questions to the Court. After discussion 
with counsel, the court supplied the following answers: 
1. "Clarify meaning of "devised a scheme or artifice" (#4). Can a scheme or artifice be 
something that is only pre-planned or can it be something spur of the moment? 
Response: The terms "scheme" and "artifice" are not subject to a specific legal definition. You 
should, therefore, give them a common English language interpretation. Scheme is defined as "a 
systematic program for attaining some object or an orderly combination of things on a definite 
plan." "Artifice" is defined as "trickery" or "an artful trick." A communication fraud may be 
established by either a scheme or an artifice intended to defraud another. There is no 
requirement for either a scheme or an artifice that a certain amount of pre-planning take place if 
what was devised resulted in either a scheme or an artifice to defraud as noted above. 
2. Is her receiving hospital treatment qualify (in instruction 4, item 4) as anything of value, or 
instruction 4 item 6, as something other than monetary value? 
Response: What you have asked is a question of fact. If you determine that hospital treatment is 
a thing of value which is the object of a scheme.or artifice to defraud you may consider if the 
requisite value is met. You may also determine if hospital treatment is something of value which 
cannot be given a dollar worth for purposes of "something other than monetary value." The 
intent of instruction 4 is to explain that in order to establish a violation of the relevant statute the 
evidence must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a scheme or artifice to defraud to obtain 
something existed and, then, to determine the nature and/or value of whatever was sought. 
3. Instruction #9-is it a clarification or related to any of the other instructions? 
Response: Instruction 9 means what it says. If someone has the requisite mental element for the 
commission of an offense and then commits some act to solicit, request, command, encourage, or 
intentionally aid another person to commit an act which would complete the offense, then both 
may be guilty of the same offense. 
ADDENDUM B 
Jury Instruction No. 4 
INSTRUCTION NO. M 
In order for yoxifind the Defendant guilty of the offense of Communications Fraud, you must 
find that each of the following essential elements of the crime charged in the Information have been 
established beyond a reasonable doubt: 
(1) That Richard Jeremy Martinson, 
(2) On or about December 10,2001, 
(3) Knowingly, intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth, 
(4) yDevisesta scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another 
money or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and; 
(5) Communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and; 
(6) The value of the loss or the thing sought to be obtained was or exceeded 
$5,000, or; the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud is other than 
obtaining something of monetary value. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more 
of the essential elements of the crime charged, you should find the defendant not guilty. But if the 
State has proved to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the 
offense as set forth above, then you should find the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the 
Information. 
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